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An imminent US Supreme Court ruling should resolve one of the thorniest legal issues facing  
pharmaceutical companies today.
On March 25, 2013, the US Supreme Court heard arguments in Federal Trade 
Commission v. Actavis, Inc. The Court’s deci-
sion, which will likely come out in June, should 
resolve one of the thorniest legal issues facing 
pharmaceutical companies today: whether 
brand pharmaceutical manufacturers can set-
tle patent lawsuits with generic drug makers 
by paying them to delay entering the market 
after the generics’ approval but before any of 
the brands’ relevant patents expire. Typically, 
payments to delay competitors’ entry in a 
marketplace violate antitrust laws as being 
anticompetitive. But the matter is complicated 
when patents are involved. Because patents 
are simply the right to prevent someone else 
from practicing the patented invention, paying 
someone to delay doing so could also be seen 
as pro-competitive if it grants a right to enter 
the marketplace earlier than the patent would 
normally allow. Nonetheless, there is a concern 
that these reverse payments or pay-to-delay set-
tlements are little more than two competitors 
divvying up a very lucrative market. And the 
purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the com-
plicated regulatory framework concerning the 
US Food and Drug Administration’s approval of 
generic drugs blocked by patents, is to “encour-
age patent challenges as a way of increasing con-
sumer access to low-cost drugs”1.
Because the Hatch-Waxman Act says little 
about whether reverse-payment settlements 
violate the antitrust laws, the lower courts of 
appeal have adopted a variety of—and some-
times conflicting—approaches to analyz-
ing these settlements in an antitrust context. 
Whether the Supreme Court’s ruling will have 
a significant impact on the pharmaceutical 
industry will likely depend on how the Court 
resolves these conflicts.
Under one theory, the Supreme Court may 
conclude that reverse-payment settlements 
are always or per se permissible as long as the 
generic drug enters the market before any rel-
evant patents expire. Adopting this ‘scope of 
the patent’ test will likely be a major boon to 
brand pharmaceutical companies. Historically, 
reverse-payment settlements by brand pharma-
ceutical manufacturers have allowed generics 
to enter the market, on average, 90.2 months 
before the protecting patents expire, at an aver-
age sales revenue loss to the brand of $1.31 bil-
lion (ref. 2). A scope-of-the-patent approach, 
however, would allow brand pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to structure settlements that 
essentially delayed generic entry until days or 
weeks before any relevant patents expire. This 
would ensure brand pharmaceutical companies 
supracompetitive profits for longer—and more 
predictable—periods of time.
At the other extreme, the Supreme Court 
may conclude that reverse-payment settle-
ments are per se impermissible, regardless of 
the duration or scope of the delay relative to 
the patents. But because the Hatch-Waxman 
Act generally requires brand pharmaceutical 
companies to sue their generic competitors or 
forgo market exclusivity, brand pharmas would 
often be placed in the peculiar situation of liti-
gating patent lawsuits against generics even if 
such cases are in neither parties’ best interests. 
Where a brand’s patents are weak, forced liti-
gation will more likely result in the patents’ 
invalidation, and a resulting flood of generic 
competitors. This would be good for consum-
ers but bad for both brand and generic compa-
nies. Each additional generic entrant tends to 
substantially decrease the profits of both brand 
and generic companies3. Where a brand phar-
ma’s patents are strong, however, forced litiga-
tion will likely keep generic competitors off 
the market until the patents’ expiration. This 
would be good—although costly—for brand 
pharmas, and obviously bad for consumers. In 
addition, smaller or start-up brand pharmas—
who are particularly sensitive to the validity of 
their patents—would be forced to shoulder the 
costly burden of litigation.
The Supreme Court may, however, take 
a more nuanced view than either of these 
two extremes. Rather than determining that 
reverse-payment settlements are per se permis-
sible or impermissible, the Court may conclude 
that such settlements are only presumptively 
impermissible. Brand and generic pharmas 
that wish to settle patent litigation may over-
come this presumption by proving to the 
trial court that a proposed settlement is pro- 
competitive because it also includes unrelated 
business services, structures itself around 
expected litigation costs or involves other 
unusual circumstances. This nuanced view of 
reverse-payment settlements has broad appeal 
in the legal community. It is currently sup-
ported by the Federal Trade Commission, the 
American Antitrust Institute, and in a friend-
of-the-court brief filed by 118 academics in law, 
economics and business4,5.
The effect of this nuanced rule on the 
pharma industry, however, would be unclear. 
With the diminishment of reverse payments 
as an option, only large generic manufactur-
ers will be able to afford expensive patent 
lawsuits against brand pharmas, which aver-
age $5 million through trial6. In the event 
that a business services settlement could be 
reached, this would similarly benefit larger 
generic manufacturers that have more assets 
and access to services than smaller manufac-
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one of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s sponsors, 
filed a friend-of-the-court brief in Actavis call-
ing for a ban on reverse-payment settlements7. 
Actavis’s legacy may be a political rather than 
a judicial one.
Ultimately, the effect of the Actavis ruling 
on the pharmaceutical industry will depend 
on the rules the Supreme Court adopts in ana-
lyzing reverse-payment settlements. Those 
rules may disproportionately affect larger 
pharmaceutical companies—both brands and 
generics—at the expense of smaller ones. But 
even then, Congress may very well have some-
thing to say about it.
size-specific effect would ultimately be more 
beneficial to consumers or brand pharmas than 
the current state of affairs.
Irrespective of the rule adopted by the 
Supreme Court, it is also possible that Congress 
could step in and create a rule of its own. 
Congress has recently taken an extraordinary 
interest in innovation policy despite the cur-
rent political deadlock. It passed the America 
Invents Act in 2011, the first major substantive 
change to the patent statute in over 30 years. 
New bills focusing on some of the current ills of 
patent law are now frequently introduced. And 
California congressman Henry A. Waxman, 
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